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2Introduction
For more than a century, the predominant strat-
egy for the treatment and punishment of serious 
and sometimes not-so-serious juvenile offenders 
in the United States has been placement into 
large juvenile corrections institutions, alterna-
tively known as training schools, reformatories, 
or youth corrections centers. 
Excluding the roughly 25,000 youth held in 
detention centers daily awaiting their court trials 
or pending placement to a correctional program, 
the latest official national count of youth in cor-
rectional custody, conducted in 2007, found that 
roughly 60,500 U.S. youth were confined in cor-
rectional facilities or other residential programs 
each night on the order of a juvenile delinquency 
court.1 For perspective, that’s more adolescents 
than currently reside in mid-sized American 
cities like Louisville, Kentucky; Nashville, 
Tennessee; Baltimore, Maryland; or Portland, 
Oregon. A high proportion of these confined 
youth are minority. According to the most recent 
national count, two of every five confined youth 
are African Americans and one-fifth are His-
panic; non-Hispanic white youth, who comprise 
three-fifths of the total youth population, were 
just 37 percent of the confined youth. 
America’s heavy reliance on juvenile incarceration 
is unique among the world’s developed nations. 
(See Fig. 1 on p. 3.) Though juvenile violent 
crime arrest rates are only marginally higher in 
the United States than in many other nations, 
a recently published international comparison 
found that America’s youth custody rate (includ-
ing youth in both detention and correctional 
custody) was 336 of every 100,000 youth in 2002 
—nearly five times the rate of the next highest  
nation (69 per 100,000 in South Africa).2 A 
number of nations essentially don’t incarcerate 
minors at all. In other words, mass incarceration 
of troubled and troublemaking adolescents is nei-
ther inevitable nor necessary in a modern society. 
State juvenile corrections systems in the United 
States confine youth in many types of facilities, 
including group homes, residential treatment 
centers, boot camps, wilderness programs, or  
county-run youth facilities (some of them locked,  
others secured only through staff super vision). 
But the largest share of committed youth—
about 40 percent of the total—are held in locked 
long-term youth correctional facilities operated 
primarily by state governments or by private 
firms under contract to states.3  These facilities 
are usually large, with many holding 200–300 
youth. They typically operate in a regimented 
(prison-like) fashion, and feature correctional 
hardware such as razor-wire, isolation cells, and 
locked cell blocks.
Yet these institutions have never been found to 
reduce the criminality of troubled young people. 
Quite the opposite: For decades now, follow-up 
3studies tracking youth released from juvenile 
corrections facilities have routinely reported 
high rates of recidivism. Meanwhile, reports of 
pervasive violence and abuse have been regularly 
emerging from these facilities for as long as any-
one can remember.
Nonetheless, incarceration in secure congregate-
care youth corrections facilities has persisted 
as the signature characteristic and the biggest 
budget line item of most state juvenile justice 
systems across the nation. This status quo has 
been buttressed in part by public fears of youth 
crime and by politicians’ fears of being labeled 
“soft” on crime. The aversion to change has been 
further reinforced by the closely guarded eco-
nomic interests of communities that host these 
facilities—and of the workers employed to staff 
them. Finally, states’ continuing reliance on these 
institutions has been abetted by a lack of proven 
alternatives: if not correctional confinement 
for youthful offenders, what? Until the 1980s, 
juvenile crime prevention and treatment experts 
had few answers. 
However, an avalanche of research has emerged 
over the past three decades about what works and 
doesn’t work in combating juvenile crime. This 
report provides a detailed review of this research, 
and it comes to the following conclusion: We 
now have overwhelming evidence showing that 
wholesale incarceration of juvenile offenders is a 
counterproductive public policy. While a small 
number of youthful offenders pose a serious 
threat to the public and must be confined, incar-
cerating a broader swath of the juvenile offender 
population provides no benefit for public safety. 
It wastes vast sums of taxpayer dollars. And more 
often than not, it harms the well-being and 
dampens the future prospects of the troubled 
and lawbreaking youth who get locked up. Other 
approaches usually produce equal or better 
results—sometimes far better—at a fraction of 
the cost.
The idea of shuttering youth corrections facili-
ties and substantially shrinking the number of 
youth in confinement may sound radical. But the 
reality is that in large swaths of the nation—on 
the east coast, west coast, and in middle America, 
JUVENILE INCARCERATION RATE 
PER 100,000 YOUTH POPULATION
FIGURE 1
YOUTH INCARCERATION RATE: UNITED STATES VS. OTHER NATIONS
Source: Hazel, Neal, Cross-National Comparison of Youth Justice, London: Youth Justice Board, 2008.
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4in big states and small, red states and blue—it’s 
already happening. Often prompted by lawsuits 
and revelations of abuse, or by mounting budget 
pressures, or by studies showing high recidivism, 
many states have slashed their juvenile correc-
tions populations in recent years—causing no 
observable increase in juvenile crime rates. The 
trend is continuing, though the pace of change 
remains uneven—in part because the isolated 
changes are occurring largely under the radar, not 
as part of any organized movement. The winds 
of change are blowing, but they have not yet 
gathered gale-force intensity. 
The evidence is clear that these changes must 
continue. The weight of expert opinion solidly 
concurs.
“We have to recognize that incarceration of 
youth per se is toxic,” says Dr. Barry Krisberg, 
the longtime president of the National Council 
on Crime and Delinquency now on faculty at the 
University of California-Berkeley, “so we need to 
reduce incarceration of young people to the very 
small dangerous few. And we’ve got to recog-
nize that if we lock up a lot of kids, it’s going to 
increase crime.”4 
Douglas Abrams, a juvenile justice scholar at the 
University of Missouri, concluded in 2007 that 
“More than a century after the creation of the 
nation’s first juvenile court grounded in reha-
bilitative impulses, many states still maintain 
inhumane, thoroughly ineffective juvenile pris-
ons that neither rehabilitate children nor protect 
public safety.”5
“The best word to describe America’s addiction 
to training schools is ‘iatrogenic’—a cure that 
makes problems worse,” says Paul DeMuro, 
who served as commissioner of the Pennsylvania 
juvenile corrections system in the late 1970s and 
has since served as an expert witness in numerous 
legal cases concerning conditions of confine-
ment in juvenile facilities. “The model has been 
around for 150 years, and has proven a failure by 
any measure.”6
The main body of this report details six pervasive 
flaws in the states’ long-standing heavy reliance 
on large, prison-like correctional institutions. 
Specifically, the report will show that these facili-
ties are frequently: (1) dangerous, (2) ineffective, 
(3) unnecessary, (4) obsolete, (5) wasteful, and 
(6) inadequate. A subsequent chapter addresses 
the question of public safety, finding that states 
where juvenile confinement was sharply reduced 
in recent years experienced more favorable 
trends in juvenile crime than jurisdictions which 
maintained or increased their correctional facility 
populations. 
Finally, the report provides recommendations for 
states on how to reduce juvenile incarceration 
and redesign their juvenile corrections systems. 
The time has come for states to embrace a 
fundamentally different orientation to treating 
adolescent offenders—an approach grounded in 
evidence that promises to be far more humane, 
cost-effective, and protective of public safety than 
our time-worn and counterproductive reliance 
on juvenile incarceration.
5What’s Wrong With America’s Juvenile  
Corrections Facilities?
What is so wrong with juvenile incarceration? The case against America’s youth prisons and 
correctional training schools can be neatly summarized in six words: dangerous, ineffective, 
unnecessary, obsolete, wasteful, and inadequate.
Since 1970, systemic violence, abuse, and/or  
excessive use of isolation or restraints have been  
documented in the juvenile corrections facili-
ties of 39 states (plus the District of Columbia 
and Puerto Rico). In 32 of those states (plus 
Washington, DC, and Puerto Rico), the abusive 
conditions have been documented since 1990, 
and in 22 states (plus Washington, DC), the 
maltreatment has been documented since 2000. 
(See Fig. 2 on p. 7.)
Included in these figures are states where: (a) law-
suits filed by the U.S. Justice Department and/or  
public interest legal advocates have succeeded in 
producing a court-sanctioned remedy to address 
alleged violence or abuse in juvenile facilities;  
and/or (b) authoritative reports written by 
reputable media outlets or respected public or 
private agencies have presented solid evidence  
of maltreatment. In all cases, the evidence  
shows that—at least at one particular point in 
time—one or more state-funded youth correc-
tions facilities displayed a systemic or recurring 
failure to protect confined youth from serious 
physical or psychological harm in the forms 
of violence from staff or other youth, sexual 
assaults, and/or excessive use of isolation or 
restraints. In other words, states have been iden-
tified not for one or a handful of isolated events, 
but for a sustained pattern of maltreatment.* 
Combined over the past four decades, 57 law suits 
in 33 states plus the District of Columbia and 
Puerto Rico have resulted in a court-sanctioned 
remedy in response to alleged abuse or otherwise 
unconstitutional conditions in juvenile facilities. 
Of these lawsuits, 52 have included allegations 
of systemic problems with violence, physical or 
sexual abuse by facility staff, and/or excessive use 
of isolation or restraint. The remaining lawsuits 
have been limited to other types of unconsti-
tutional conditions, such as failure to provide 
Dangerous America’s juvenile corrections institutions subject  
confined youth to intolerable levels of violence, abuse, and other forms  
of maltreatment. 
1.
*Even in three of the 11 states where dangerous/abusive conditions have not been demonstrated conclusively enough to  
meet all of the above conditions, substantial evidence of maltreatment has been reported in at least one facility since 2000.
6required services (education, health care, and 
mental health treatment), fire safety and other 
environmental safety issues, or lack of required 
access to mail and to attorneys.* 
In many states, including several where there  
has not been successful litigation, media reports 
or investigations undertaken 
by advocacy organ izations or 
government watchdog agencies 
have also documented systemic 
abuses in youth corrections 
facilities. For instance, a 1998 
series in the Arkansas Demo-
crat-Gazette revealed violent 
and deplorable conditions in 
state youth facilities.7 In Con-
necticut in 2002, audit reports 
released jointly by the state’s 
Child Advocate and Attorney 
General’s offices revealed exces-
sive use of force and restraint 
and other problems at the state’s 
training school,8 as well as staff-
sanctioned violence and other 
maltreatment in a second state-
funded facility.9 In North Caro-
lina, a nine-month newspaper 
series about abuses in one youth
facility in 2003 prompted a major investigation 
by the state auditor that detailed problematic and 
often abusive conditions in facilities throughout 
the state.
The map on page 7 is not meant to imply that 
dangerous or abusive conditions persist in the 
states identified. In most cases, revelations of 
widespread maltreatment have led to court-
ordered or state-sponsored reforms—increased 
staffing, new policies on isolation and restraint, 
improved education or mental health services, 
and more. And meaningful improvements have 
been achieved in many jurisdictions. However, 
the map does show how frequently problem-
atic conditions have arisen in juvenile facili-
ties throughout the nation in recent decades. 
Moreover, the fact that so many states 
have experienced these problems since 
2000 suggests that few lessons have 
been learned from past outbreaks of 
maltreatment, or that large juvenile 
corrections facilities are, by their very 
nature, exceedingly difficult to oper-
ate in a consistently safe and humane 
fashion.
More specifically, America’s youth 
corrections institutions suffer from the 
following safety and abuse problems:
n Widespread physical abuse and exces-
sive use of force by facility staff. A March 
2008 Associated Press story found 
that 13,000 claims of abuse had been 
reported from 2004 through 2007 in 
state-run juvenile facilities nationwide. 
Of these, 1,343 instances of abuse had 
been officially confirmed by authori-
ties.10 Countless more claims had 
never been investigated properly, or never filed 
by youth due to lack of functioning grievance 
systems and/or fear of retribution. 
n An epidemic of sexual abuse. In 2010, the 
federal Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS) released 
the first-ever national study on sexual abuse in 
youth corrections facilities. For the study, BJS 
surveyed a representative sample of the 26,650 
youth confined in large juvenile facilities nation-
wide and found that 12 percent of them—more 
than 3,000 young people—had been victimized 
*In recent years, the pace of private class-action litigation over conditions of confinement has slowed considerably. Passed in 1995, 
the Prison Litigation Reform Act placed difficult new restrictions on private lawsuits over facility conditions. Then in 2003, a 
federal court ruling further limited the compensation available to attorneys in class-action lawsuits—even in some cases where 
conditions are found to be problematic. Absent these developments, the number of successful lawsuits would likely be higher.
That so many states 
have experienced 
these problems 
since 2000 suggests 
that few lessons 
have been learned 
from past mal­
treatment, or that 
large juvenile 
correc tions facili­
ties are exceedingly 
difficult to operate 
in a consistently 
safe and humane 
fashion.
7sexually during the prior year by staff or 
other youth in their facilities. Of these youth, 
nearly half reported incidents involving physi-
cal force or other forms of threats or coercion 
and unwanted genital contact. The remaining 
incidents involved sexual relations between staff 
(most often female staff ) and confined youth. In 
13 of the facilities surveyed, at least 20 percent of 
confined youth reported either being forced into 
sexual acts by staff or other youth and/or sexual 
relations (including genital contact) with staff.11 
In Texas, 750 complaints of sexual abuse were 
filed by youth confined in the state correctional 
facilities from 2000 to 2007—most of which 
had never been addressed due to intimidation 
of abused youth and the lack of a functioning 
grievance system.12
n Rampant overreliance on isolation and restraint. 
While no national data are available on the use 
of isolation and restraints, excessive reliance on 
these practices was alleged in 46 of the 57 suc-
cessful lawsuits filed against juvenile corrections 
agencies since 1970. In Ohio, youth confined in 
state correctional facilities spent 66,023 hours in 
seclusion in July 2009—an average of more than 
50 hours per resident.13 And that was one year 
after an intensive review of Ohio’s youth correc-
tions facilities concluded that isolation “is used 
too often, for too long, and without adequate 
treatment or educational opportunities. The 
Violent/abusive conditions clearly documented since 2000.
Violent/abusive conditions clearly documented after 1990 but not since 2000.
Violent/abusive conditions clearly documented after 1970 but not since 1990.
Evidence but no proof of violent/abusive conditions since 2000.
 
For this map, “systemic or recurring maltreatment” is identified when clear evidence has emerged from federal investigations, class-action lawsuits, or authoritative 
reports written by reputable media outlets or respected public or private agencies showing that—at least at one particular time—one or more state-funded youth 
corrections facilities repeatedly failed to protect youth from violence by staff or other youth, sexual assaults, and/or excessive use of isolation or restraints. 
“Evidence but no proof” is indicated when credible reports of maltreatment have emerged, but not enough to satisfy the above criteria.
For more information, visit www.aecf.org/noplaceforkids. 
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FIGURE 2
SYSTEMIC OR RECURRING MALTREATMENT IN JUVENILE CORRECTIONS FACILITIES IN THE STATES: 1970 TO PRESENT
8extended—at times, months on end—use of 
isolation (i.e., segregation) must be immediately 
revisited and dramatically changed.”14 A 2003 
review in California found that on any given day, 
about 450 youth (10–12 percent of the popula-
tion) in six of the state’s large youth corrections 
facilities were confined to their rooms for 23 
hours per day.15
n Unchecked youth-on-youth violence. Thirty-eight 
of the 57 successful lawsuits filed over conditions 
of confinement since 1970 have alleged failure 
to protect youth from harm. At the Plainfield 
Juvenile Correctional Facility in Indiana, four 
youths suffered broken jaws in assaults by other 
youth in a seven-month period in 2003–04.16 At 
the Evins Regional Juvenile Center in Texas, staff 
documented 1,025 youth-on-youth assaults in 
2005, and 568 more in the first half of 2006—
an average of about three assaults every day.17 
A review of safety conditions in California youth 
institutions in 2003 declared that “One might 
easily conclude that an intense atmosphere of 
fear permeates California’s youth corrections 
facilities.”18
n Frequent violence against staff. Staff working in 
youth facilities are also assaulted, injured, and 
otherwise abused with disturbing frequency. In 
four Arizona juvenile correctional facilities, for 
instance, 484 assaults on staff were reported in 
2003—an average of 40 incidents per month.19 
Also, in many facilities staff are frequently 
subjected to taunting and other belligerent 
behaviors. 
In many states, abuse and maltreatment have 
reached crisis proportions in recent years.
n In Florida, the Orlando Sun Sentinel has 
reported that “One of the most egregious child 
abusers in Florida is the very agency that’s sup-
posed to rehabilitate troubled youths: the state 
Department of Juvenile Justice.”20 
n In New York, a governor’s task force reported 
in December 2009 that “there is compelling 
evidence that New York’s juvenile justice system 
is unsafe.” The task force described the youth 
corrections system as “badly broken” and declared 
that “the need for systemwide reform is urgent.”21 
n In Texas, investigations undertaken in the wake 
of a lurid sex-abuse scandal in 2007 revealed 
a breakdown in the state’s juvenile corrections 
agency so pervasive that the agency was placed 
into receivership.
n In Ohio, a 2008 fact-finding report completed 
in connection with a class-action lawsuit against 
the state’s Department of Youth Services sup-
ported all of the alleged failures: unnecessary 
force; arbitrary and excessive use of isolation 
and seclusion; arbitrary and excessive discipline; 
inadequate mental health, medical, and dental 
care; inadequate education services; inadequate 
structured programming; broadly inadequate 
training of staff; an unsafe living environment; 
and a dysfunctional grievance system.22
n California’s youth corrections system has 
remained in perpetual crisis for more than a 
decade. In March 2006, a team of nationally 
recognized experts assembled to assist in imple-
menting court-ordered reforms observed, “This 
is a system that is broken almost everywhere you 
look.” The experts listed 18 severe and systemic 
deficiencies—including “high levels of violence 
9and fear,” “unsafe conditions for youth and 
staff,” “frequent lockdowns,” and “capitulation 
to gang culture”—and they concluded: “It is not 
just reform that is needed. Everything needs to 
be fixed.”23
n Arizona, Arkansas, Georgia, Hawaii, Indiana, 
Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, South Caro-
lina, and South Dakota have also suffered high-
profile juvenile corrections abuse scandals over 
the past 10 to 15 years, and serious problems 
have been cited in several other states as well.
Of course, abuse and maltreatment are not omni-
present in juvenile correctional facilities. Some 
facilities provide humane care for confined youth, 
offering meaningful rehabilitative treatment in a 
safe and caring environment. Others fall short of 
this ideal, but still protect youth from severe forms 
of abuse and maltreatment. Even in the worst 
facilities, many staff are highly dedicated with a 
deep concern for the well-being of their charges.
However, the first-ever nationally representative 
survey of youth in correctional care, published in 
2010, confirms that, while not ubiquitous, abuse 
and maltreatment remain widespread in America’s 
youth corrections facilities. Among youth in 
secure corrections facilities or camp programs, 
42 percent said they were somewhat or very afraid 
of being physically attacked. More specifically, 30 
percent were afraid of attack from another youth, 
and 27 percent were afraid of attack from a staff 
member. (Many were afraid of attack from both 
youth and staff.) In addition, 45 percent of youth 
confined in secure correctional facilities and camp 
programs reported that staff “use force when they 
don’t really need to,” and 30 percent said that 
staff place youth into solitary confinement or lock 
them up alone as discipline.24
Given the inability of public officials to prevent 
maltreatment or even to clean up facilities where 
inhumane conditions are revealed, it would be dif-
ficult to argue that correctional confinement offers 
a safe venue to rehabilitate delinquent youth.
Ineffective The outcomes of correctional confinement are 
poor. Recidivism rates are almost uniformly high, and incarceration 
in juvenile facilities depresses youths’ future success in education 
and employment.
2.
An extensive Internet search and literature review 
plus limited outreach to state corrections agencies 
for this publication identified recidivism analyses 
for youth exiting juvenile correctional placements 
in 38 states, plus the District of Columbia.
These recidivism studies vary in many important 
dimensions, including the populations examined 
and the measures employed to track recidivism 
over different lengths of time. While these varia-
tions make comparing recidivism outcomes from 
one state to another problematic, the overall 
body of recidivism evidence indicates plainly 
that confinement in youth corrections facilities 
doesn’t work well as a strategy to steer delinquent 
youth away from crime. (See Fig. 3 on p. 10.)
10
n Rearrest. Available studies of youth released 
from residential corrections programs find that 
70 to 80 percent of youth are rearrested within 
two or three years. Of the six states reporting 
juvenile or adult arrests within two years of 
release, none showed less than a 68 percent rear-
rest rate, and virtually all states reporting three-
year rearrest rates converge at about 75 percent.
n New Adjudications/Convictions. Available stud-
ies find that 38 to 58 percent of youth released 
from juvenile corrections facilities are found 
guilty of new offenses (as a juvenile or an adult) 
within two years and 45 to 72 percent within 
three years.
n Return to custody. Recidivism studies examin-
ing return to custody are skewed by data from 
Missouri, which dismantled its training schools 
in the early 1980s and now operates a widely 
praised network of small, treatment-oriented 
youth facilities. Excluding Missouri, available 
studies show that 26 to 62 percent of youth 
released from juvenile custody are re-incarcerated 
on new criminal charges within three years and 
18 to 46 percent within two years. (In Missouri, 
the three-year re-incarceration rate is just 
16.2 percent.)
Long-term cohort studies paint even a bleaker 
picture of training schools’ impact on future 
offending. In New York State, 89 percent of 
boys and 81 percent of girls released from state 
juvenile corrections institutions in the early 1990s 
were arrested as adults by age 28. Among boys, 
 Recidivism Measure       Tracking Period States Reporting Range of Recidivism Results
Rearrest for a new crime 
(misdemeanor or felony)
Rearrest for a new  
felony offense
Adjudication/conviction for a 
new offense (misdemeanor  
or felony)
Adjudication/conviction for a 
new felony offense
Return to correctional custody 
(juvenile or adult) for a new 
offense
Return to correctional custody 
(juvenile or adult) for a new 
offense or technical violation
FIGURE 3
STATE JUVENILE RECIDIVISM RESULTS: OUTCOMES FOR YOUTH RELEASED FROM CORRECTIONAL CUSTODY
 1 year DE, FL, MD, OK, SC, VA 37 – 67 percent
 2 years HI, MD, NC, NY, SC, VA 68 – 82 percent
 3 years CA, NY, TN, VA 74 – 75 percent
>  3 years NY, SC 73 – 89 percent
 1 year DE, FL 34 – 45 percent
 2 years MI 37 percent
>  3 years NY 83 percent (boys only)
 2 years AK, HI, MD, NY, VA 38 – 58 percent
 3 years MD, NY, VA 45 – 72 percent
> 3 years NY, SC, WA 60 – 85 percent
 2 years MD, MN, OR 22 – 43 percent
 3 years MN, OR 34 – 53 percent
> 3 years NY 65 percent
 2 years HI, LA, MD, MO, NJ, NY, VA, WI 15 – 46 percent
 3 years IN, LA, MD, MO, NY, VA 16 – 62 percent
> 3 years SC 31 percent
 2 years AZ, KS, OH, TX 34 – 46 percent
 3 years AZ, IN, MO, TX 24 – 51 percent
Sources: All figures are taken from state juvenile recidivism studies. A complete list of state recidivism studies can be found online at www.aecf.org/
noplaceforkids.
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65 percent were convicted of felonies by age 28, 
and 71 percent were incarcerated in an adult jail 
or prison.25 In South Carolina, a 1995 study of 
youth born in 1967 showed that 82 percent of 
those who were incarcerated as juveniles were later 
imprisoned or placed on probation as adults.26
Other Research. In addition to recidivism analy-
ses, criminologists have conducted more sophis-
ticated studies in recent years to pinpoint the 
impact of juvenile confinement on the criminal 
careers of delinquent youth, and to compare the 
effectiveness of youth corrections facilities to a 
range of alternative treatments and punishments. 
This research reveals two critical lessons.
First, the vast majority of studies find that incar-
ceration is no more effective than probation or 
alternative sanctions in reducing the criminality of 
adjudicated youth, and a number of well-designed 
studies suggest that correctional placements actually 
exacerbate criminality.
In 2009, for instance, an intensive long-term 
study of more than 1,300 juvenile offenders 
compared the success of youth sentenced to 
juvenile corrections facilities versus similar youth 
who remained in the community under proba-
tion supervision. Controlling statistically for 66 
different background characteristics, the study 
found that placement in a correctional institu-
tion resulted in a small but statistically insignifi-
cant increase in both self-reported offending and 
likelihood of rearrest compared with alternative 
sanctions. “The results show no marginal gain 
from placement in terms of averting future 
offending,” the authors concluded.27
Using a technique called “meta-analysis,” which 
allows scholars to aggregate results from multiple 
studies, a 2009 paper by Mark Lipsey assessed 
the results of 361 high-quality research studies 
measuring the effects of programs designed to 
rehabilitate juvenile offenders. Lipsey reported 
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“no significant relationship in this overall analysis 
between recidivism effects and the level of  
juvenile justice supervision.”28 
An eye-opening study in Montreal tracked 779  
low-income boys from the time they were 
kindergartners (in 1984) up through age 25. 
Involvement in the juvenile justice system proved
by far the strongest predictor of adult crimi-
nality of all the many variables 
examined. Holding other fac-
tors constant, youth incarcer-
ated as juveniles were 38 times 
as likely as youth with equivalent 
backgrounds and self-reported 
offending histories to be sanc-
tioned for crimes they committed 
as adults.29
Second, incarceration is especially 
ineffective for less-serious youthful 
offenders. Many studies find that 
incarceration actually increases 
recidivism among youth with lower- 
risk profiles and less-serious offend-
ing histories. 
In a recent Ohio study, low- and moderate-risk 
youth placed into community supervision pro-
grams proved less likely to re-offend than similar 
youth placed into correctional facilities and only 
one-fifth as likely to be incarcerated for subse-
quent offenses.30 (See Fig. 4 on p. 11.) In Florida, 
a 2007 study involving more than 40,000 youth-
ful offenders found that those assessed as low 
risk who were placed into residential facilities 
not only re-offended at a higher rate than similar 
youth who remained in the community, they also 
re-offended at a higher rate than high-risk youth 
placed into correctional facilities.31 In Virginia, 
low-risk youth released from correctional facilities 
had substantially higher rearrest rates than similar 
youth placed on probation.32
Damaging Youths’ Futures. Beyond its failure 
to reduce future offending and protect public 
safety, juvenile incarceration also damages young 
people’s future success. Youth in confinement 
typically face long odds in their hopes to suc-
ceed in school and the labor market. Most are 
far below grade level in academic achievement, 
and a substantial percentage suffer from learning 
disabilities or mental health disor-
ders. Also, many or most come from 
high-poverty neighborhoods. Yet the 
evidence is clear that incarceration 
itself creates a significant additional 
barrier to success.
Follow-up studies have long shown 
that youth released from juvenile 
correctional facilities seldom succeed 
in school. A 1987 study of youth 
released from a training school found 
that only 28 percent reenrolled in 
school and remained enrolled one 
year after release.33 A 2006 study 
found that just one-third of youth 
exiting a Pennsylvania correctional camp pro-
gram who said they intended to return to school 
actually did so.34 A recent analysis of young 
people included in the National Longitudinal 
Youth Survey found that incarceration at age 
16 or earlier led to a 26 percent lower chance of 
graduating high school by age 19.35
Juvenile incarceration also exacts a heavy toll on 
youths’ future employment. One study found 
that—holding all other variables constant—
individuals incarcerated as juveniles or young 
adults suffered a 5 percent reduction in employ-
ment (equivalent to about three weeks less work 
per year) four years after release. Black youth 
saw a 9 percent (five weeks per year) reduction. 
Even 15 years after release, those who had been 
incarcerated in their youth worked 10 percent 
fewer hours per year than similar individuals who 
had not been incarcerated.36
The overall body of 
recidivism evidence 
indicates plainly 
that confinement in 
youth corrections 
facilities doesn’t 
work well as a 
strategy to steer 
delinquent youth 
away from crime.
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FIGURE 5
MOST SERIOUS OFFENSE OF ALL COMMITTED YOUTH IN THE U.S.: 2007
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Source: Sickmund, et al. (2011). “Easy Access to the Census of Juveniles in Residential Placement.” 
Available at www.ojjdp.gov/ojstatbb/ezacjrp.
A tragic irony of the abuses and regrettable 
outcomes detailed in the previous sections is 
that many of the youth confined in juvenile 
correctional facilities have no records of serious 
offending that would necessitate their confine-
ment to protect the public. Incarceration is 
particularly inappropriate for these lower-risk 
youth—increasing their odds of recidivism and 
damaging their prospects for a successful transi-
tion to adulthood.
Just 12 percent of the nearly 150,000 delinquent 
youth placed into residential programs by juve-
nile courts for delinquency offenses in 2007 were 
committed for any of the four serious violent 
crimes (murder, rape, robbery, or aggravated 
assault) that the FBI defines as “violent index 
offenses.”37 (See Fig. 5 below.) The most recent 
one-day snapshot of adjudicated youth confined 
in residential facilities nationwide (taken in 
October 2007) showed that just 26 percent were 
committed for a violent index offense.38 Among 
youth confined in “long-term secure” facilities, 
which includes most training schools and youth 
prisons, the rate was 38 percent.39
In New York, 53 percent of youth admitted to 
the state’s youth corrections facilities in 2007 
were placed for a misdemeanor. All were younger 
than 16 when they committed their offenses.40 In 
Florida’s youth corrections system, 58 percent of 
all youth placed into Department of Juvenile Jus-
tice residential facilities in 2008–09—including 
56 percent of those placed into secure facilities—
were committed for misdemeanors or technical 
violations of probation, not felony offenses. Just 
13 percent were for serious violent crimes.41 In 
Arkansas, just 15 percent of commitments to 
state youth corrections facilities in 2007 involved 
a serious felony crime, while 42 percent involved 
Unnecessary A substantial percentage of youth confined  
in youth corrections facilities pose minimal risk to public safety.3.
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misdemeanors. Three-fourths of the youth incar-
cerated for a misdemeanor had no prior adjudi-
cations.42 In South Carolina, only one of the top 
10 offenses resulting in correctional placements 
in 2008–09 was a violent felony. Instead, the 
most common offenses were probation violations 
and contempt of court.43
Why are juvenile courts sending so many 
low-level offenders to correctional institutions? 
Available evidence and expert opinion point to 
four driving factors:
Lack of Programs and Services. Low-level 
youthful offenders are being placed into resi-
dential programs due to a widespread failure 
in most jurisdictions to invest in high-quality 
community-based programming for delinquent 
youth. This dynamic, which plays out in states 
and communities nationwide, was described 
aptly in the 1990s by then-Governor Christine 
Todd Whitman of New Jersey: “A judge in one 
county has many options to craft appropriate 
orders for young offenders. In the next county 
over, especially if it is an urban county, a judge 
may have very few options between probation 
and incarceration. That’s like choosing between 
aspirin or a lobotomy for a migraine.”44
Counterproductive Financial Incentives. Many 
local juvenile courts and probation agencies face 
strong financial incentives to place youth in state 
custody, rather than providing community-based 
treatment. Most states pay the full cost to incar-
cerate juveniles in state facilities. Meanwhile, 
in the 38 states where local courts or probation 
agencies oversee community supervision and 
treatment programs, substantial state funding 
is rarely provided. Thus, local juvenile justice 
officials often face a perverse choice between offer-
ing cost-effective community-based programming 
(at considerable expense to local government) 
or committing youth to more expensive and less 
effective custody programs (at no local expense).
Dumping Grounds. Juvenile corrections systems 
have become the primary point of service for 
youth with mental health conditions and other 
serious disadvantages—youth who would be 
more appropriately and effectively served by 
other human service systems.
n Mental Health. “During the 1990s, state after 
state experienced the collapse of public mental 
health services for children and adolescents and 
the closing of many—in some states, all—of 
their residential facilities for seriously disturbed 
youths,” explains Dr. Thomas Grisso, a leading 
expert on mental health and juvenile justice. 
“The juvenile justice system soon became 
the primary referral for youths with mental 
disorders.”45
n Public Schools. So-called “zero tolerance” poli-
cies have caused a substantial increase in school 
suspensions and expulsions in the past two 
decades, as well as an alarming number of stu-
dents being arrested and referred to the juvenile 
justice system for disorderly behavior that was 
once considered routine and handled informally 
within the schools. Youth taken to court for 
minor offenses “generally get some sort of slap 
on the wrist, such as a few days of community 
service,” concluded a 2007 report from the Chil-
dren’s Defense Fund, “but they also get a record. 
If the youth comes before the court again, this 
original charge likely will increase the penalty 
and minor charges can add up over time.”46
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n Child Welfare. Youth involved in the child 
welfare system are also at high risk for placement 
into juvenile justice facilities. Studies find that 
youth who have been abused or neglected as 
children and become involved in the child wel-
fare system are far more likely than other youth 
to be arrested as juveniles.47 Once arrested, these 
so-called “dual-jurisdiction” youth face exagger-
ated risks both for pre-trial detention and for 
commitment into youth corrections facilities or 
other out-of-home placements.48
Punishing Defiance, Not Delinquency. Many 
youth without serious offending histories are 
placed into custody for repeatedly violating rules 
and/or behaving disrespectfully toward judges, 
probation officers, and other authorities. In New 
York City, “markers of institutional compliance 
and noncompliance”—including probation 
violations, prior status offenses, or failure to 
admit their crimes and express remorse—are 
the “driving forces behind dispositional recom-
mendations and orders,” a recent study found. 
“Youth who demonstrate to the court that they 
cannot or will not obey its orders are identified 
as prime candidates for incarceration.” The study 
also found that “despite the profound impact 
that they have on the risk of incarceration, these 
[markers of institutional non-compliance] are 
not very predictive of the risk of recidivism.”49
Nationwide, nearly 12 percent of delinquent 
youth in secure correctional custody have been 
incarcerated for violating probation or aftercare 
rules, not for committing new criminal offenses. 
In some states, the share rises as high as 20 or 
even 30 percent,50 even though many youth 
confined on these technical violations have never 
been adjudicated for a violent or serious offense. 
Often, the decision to place a youth in a residen-
tial facility for probation violations or for violat-
ing aftercare rules is made at the sole discretion 
of a probation or parole officer. 
Excessive Lengths of Stay. For all of these 
reasons, America’s juvenile correctional facilities 
are too often incarcerating the wrong kids…and 
for the wrong reasons. However, admissions are 
only half the equation that determines the size 
of the confined population. Equally important is 
how long these young people remain in custody 
once admitted. Here, too, the signs point toward 
widespread excess.
Average lengths of stay vary widely from one 
state to the next. In its 2009 Yearbook, the 
Council of Juvenile Correctional Administra-
tors (CJCA) reported that the average placement 
duration for boys was less than six months in 
four states and more than 18 months in three 
others, while the majority of states reporting data 
had average lengths of stay ranging from 6–12 
months (13 states) or 12–18 months (9 states).51 
This wide variation in commitment lengths is 
inconsistent with the evidence that longer spells 
of confinement have either no impact or a coun-
terproductive impact on future offending.
A recent study of New York City youth released 
from juvenile facilities found that, in terms of 
future recidivism, “The impact of length of stay 
is minimal.” A longitudinal study on youth in 
Philadelphia and Phoenix found that “There is 
little or no marginal benefit, at least in terms of 
reducing future rate of offending, for retaining 
an individual in institutional placement longer.” 
The analysis found essentially no difference in 
future offending for youth held 3–6 months 
vs. 6–9 months, 9–12 months, or more than 
12 months.52 A study of youth in California 
youth facilities in the early 1980s linked longer 
periods of juvenile incarceration to heightened 
criminality during adulthood.53 More recently, 
a study of youth released from Florida youth 
corrections facilities “revealed no consistent 
relationship between length of confinement and 
recidivism.”54
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As recently as the 1970s, the study of juvenile 
crime and delinquency remained in its infancy. 
Experts and scholars could not point to a single 
delinquency prevention or intervention program 
model with solid scientific evidence of effective-
ness. Since then, however, we have accumulated 
a wealth of new knowledge about the causes of 
delinquency and about what works and doesn’t 
work in reversing delinquent behavior. By aggre-
gating and analyzing the results of hundreds of 
evaluation studies, scholars have clarified the cru-
cial characteristics that distinguish effective juve-
nile intervention and treatment programs from 
those that are ineffective or counterproductive.
Programs offering counseling and treatment 
typically reduce recidivism, while those focused on 
coercion and control tend to produce negative or 
null effects. The most striking finding of recent 
research is that juvenile rehabilitation programs 
tend to work if, and only if, they focus on help-
ing youth develop new skills and address per-
sonal challenges. A 2009 analysis examining 361 
evaluation studies determined that the strongest 
results are achieved by programs employing a 
“therapeutic intervention philosophy.” Programs 
employing therapeutic counseling, skill-building, 
and case management approaches all produced 
an average improvement in recidivism results 
of at least 12 percent. By contrast, programs 
oriented toward surveillance, deterrence, or disci-
pline all yielded weak, null, or negative results.55 
Programs tend to succeed when they address specific 
risk factors known to influence delinquent and 
criminal behavior. These risk factors include 
anger and anti-social feelings, lack of self-control, 
lack of affection or weak supervision from 
parents, lack of role models, and poor academic 
skills. One oft-cited study found that programs 
targeting these and other “criminogenic needs” 
resulted in an average recidivism reduction of 
more than 20 percent. The same study found 
that programs designed primarily to promote 
fear of punishment (i.e., shock incarceration or 
“scared straight”) increased recidivism, as did 
interventions aimed at other goals such as boost-
ing self-esteem, talking about personal/emotional 
problems, or improving physical fitness.56
So-called “cognitive behavior therapies” offer a 
particularly effective and economical method for 
reversing delinquency. This approach, which is 
usually taught in a group format and involves 
role-playing, aims to help participants change 
their thinking patterns and develop new prob-
lem-solving and perspective-taking skills. The 
training is not expensive—typically costing 
$1,000 per participant. Yet a recent review found 
that cognitive behavioral training programs are 
associated with a 26 percent reduction in recidi-
vism—the most of any treatment modality.57
Evidence-Based Models. A handful of specific 
treatment methodologies have emerged over 
the past 25 years that consistently lower the 
Obsolete Scholars have identified a number of interventions and 
treatment strategies in recent years that consistently reduce recidivism  
among juvenile offenders. None require—and many are inconsistent 
with—incarceration in large correctional institutions.
4.
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recidivism rates of serious and chronic juvenile 
offenders when measured against conventional 
treatment and supervision approaches in care-
fully constructed scientific trials.
Multisystemic Therapy (MST) and Functional 
Family Therapy (FFT) are intensive family treat-
ment models for delinquent youth. In MST, 
therapists lead a regimented three- to five-month 
family intervention process involving multiple 
contacts each week in the family’s home and sur-
rounding community. FFT employs office-based 
counseling (an average of 12 sessions) designed 
first to engage family members and then to sup-
port meaningful behavior changes that improve 
family interaction and address the underlying 
causes of delinquent behavior. Costs average 
$6,000 to $9,500 per youth for MST and 
$3,000 to $3,500 for FFT, whereas a typical stay 
in a juvenile corrections facility (9 to 12 months 
at $241 per day) costs $66,000 to $88,000.
Both MST and FFT have been analyzed in 
numerous scientific evaluation studies over the 
past 25 years, including several randomized trials, 
and they have realized superior results in most. 
Experimental studies of MST have resulted in 
arrest rates 25 to 70 percent lower than youth 
receiving usual services. In most studies, MST 
youth have spent less than half as many days 
confined for subsequent offenses.58 In a study 
involving chronic offenders in Utah who had 
previously been incarcerated, FFT participants 
proved nearly six times more likely to avoid 
rearrest (40 percent vs. 7 percent) than youth 
receiving other treatments.59
In Multidimensional Treatment Foster Care 
(MTFC), troubled and delinquent youth are 
placed with specially trained foster families for 
six to nine months while their parents (or legal 
guardians) receive intensive counseling and 
parent training. After a series of home visits, the 
families are then reunited and provided with 
ongoing support until the home situation is 
stabilized. In several scientific studies, MTFC 
has proven superior to placement into group 
homes—where high-need youthful offenders 
with less-serious offending histories are often 
placed. In one study, serious and chronic youth-
ful offenders participating in MTFC were twice 
as likely as comparable youth placed into group 
homes to complete the program (and not run 
away), and they spent an average of 75 fewer 
days incarcerated over the subsequent two-year 
period.60
Based on these results, MST, FFT, and MTFC 
have all attracted substantial attention, and the 
models are being adopted in a number of juris-
dictions nationwide. Thus far, these efforts have 
achieved encouraging but not uniform success.
The most favorable real-world outcomes have 
occurred when MST and FFT are employed as 
an alternative to incarceration or other residential 
placements. In Florida, the Redirection Pro-
gram provides evidence-based family treatment 
(primarily MST or FFT) as an alternative to 
incarceration or residential placement for less-
serious youth offenders. An April 2010 report 
by Florida’s Office of Policy Program Analysis & 
Government Accountability found that, com-
pared to comparable youth placed into residen-
tial facilities, youth participating the Redirection 
Program were 9 percent less likely to be arrested 
for a new crime (and 15 percent less likely to be 
arrested for a new violent felony); 14 percent 
less likely to be convicted of a new felony; and 
35 percent less likely to be sentenced to an adult 
prison.61 As of August 2008, the Redirection Pro-
gram had saved taxpayers $41.6 million over the 
prior four years by steering less-serious offenders 
away from expensive residential confinement and 
by reducing recidivism.62 (See Fig. 6 on p. 18.)
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Despite these successes, however, no state has 
“scaled up” any of these evidence-based models 
to serve all or nearly all youth who could benefit. 
In a recent essay, MST designer Scott Henggeler 
and a colleague estimated that 15,000 juvenile 
offenders per year participate in MST, FFT, or 
MTFC currently. “If 160,000 juvenile justice 
youth are placed annually and we assume that 
an equal number are at high risk of placement,” 
Henggeler noted, “then fewer than 5% of 
eligible high-risk juvenile offenders in the U.S. 
are treated with an evidence-based treatment 
annually.”63
Other Promising Approaches. Though they lack 
the powerful scientific evidence of MST, FFT, 
and MTFC, a number of other alternatives have 
also demonstrated promising results in reducing 
delinquency and obviating the need for correc-
tional confinement. These include: 
Wraparound services. Such as those offered by 
the Wraparound Milwaukee program—pool 
resources from a variety of funding streams (juve-
nile justice, community mental health, Medicaid, 
others) to pay for coordinators who help develop 
care plans and access an array of services tailored 
to the needs of youth with behavioral disorders 
or other mental health conditions.64
Rigorous career preparation and vocational train-
ing—such as those provided by YouthBuild. A 
program for high-risk youth and young adults 
now operating in more than 250 sites nation-
wide, YouthBuild serves many court-involved 
youth and combines remedial academic educa-
tion with hands-on construction skills training.65
Mental health and substance abuse treatment 
programs. Several promising programs, some with 
strong evidence of effectiveness, provide targeted 
treatment services to address mental health and 
substance abuse problems. These include: 
n Mental health diversion projects—such as the 
Enhanced Mental Health Services Initiative 
in Texas66 and the Behavioral Health/Juvenile 
Justice program in Ohio67—that steer youth to 
mental health treatment;
n Specialty court programs—such as the nearly 
500 juvenile drug courts operating nation-
wide,68 and mental health treatment courts. 
While debate over their efficacy continues, these 
models work with delinquent youth with serious 
substance abuse or emotional disturbances and 
supervise their participation in court-ordered 
treatment plans, rather than assigning them to 
routine probation;69 and 
FIGURE 6
SAVINGS GENERATED BY FLORIDA’S REDIRECTION PROGRAM
 Savings
 Costs of Residential Placements Averted (2,033 youth)  $50.8 million 
 Savings from Reduced Recidivism  $ 5.2 million
 Savings Subtotal    $56.0 million
 Costs
 Youth Referred to Treatment 2,867
 Youth Completing Treatment 2,033
 Cost of Redirection Treatment   $14.4 million
 Net Savings (Savings Subtotal–Costs)    $41.6 million
Source: Florida Office of Program Policy Analysis & Government Accountability, Redirection Saves $36.4 million and Avoids $5.2 million in Recommitment and Prison Costs,  
Report No. 09-27, May 2009.
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n Family-focused, non-residential substance abuse 
treatment methods for adolescents—for example, 
Multidimensional Family Therapy and Brief 
Strategic Family Therapy—have demonstrated 
substantial reductions in substance abuse and 
delinquency in scientific evaluation studies.70 
Indeed, a recent study found that substance-
abusing youthful offenders who received any 
type of substance abuse treatment achieved small 
but statistically significant reductions in alcohol 
use, and those receiving extended treatment also 
reduced marijuana use.71
Intensive advocate/mentor programs. Under this 
approach, local agencies assign dedicated advo-
cates to track, supervise, and mentor delinquent 
youth in the community. Youth Advocate 
Programs, Inc.; Southwest Key; and the Choice 
program are serving hundreds of youth each year 
in multiple sites. While none of these efforts 
has been carefully evaluated, all have reported 
positive results in terms both of recidivism and 
academic/employment outcomes. 
Wasteful Most states are spending vast sums of taxpayer money and 
devoting the bulk of their juvenile justice budgets to correctional institu-
tions and other facility placements when non-residential programming 
options deliver equal or better results for a fraction of the cost.
5.
One of the most telling traits of juvenile incar-
ceration, one of the characteristics that distin-
guishes it most clearly as an obsolete response to 
adolescent lawbreaking, is cost.
Confining juvenile offenders in correctional 
institutions and other residential settings is far 
more expensive than standard probation or con-
ventional community supervision and treatment 
programs. It is also many times more expensive 
than new evidence-based treatment models 
like Multisystemic Therapy, Functional Family 
Therapy, and Multidimensional Treatment Foster 
Care. Other promising approaches also cost a 
fraction as much as incarceration.
Indeed, the dollar figures associated with juvenile 
confinement can be jaw-dropping. According 
to the American Correctional Association, the 
average daily cost nationwide to incarcerate one 
juvenile offender in 2008 was $241. That trans-
lates to an average cost of $66,000 to $88,000 
to incarcerate a young person in a juvenile 
correctional facility for 9 to 12 months.72 This 
sum is many times the cost of: tuition and fees 
at a public four-year university ($7,605) or a 
public two-year community or technical col-
lege ($2,713);73 average per pupil expenditures 
for public elementary and secondary schools 
nationwide ($10,259);74 high-quality mentor-
ing programs such as Big Brothers/Big Sisters 
(slightly less than $1,000 per participant);75 
or the YouthBuild career preparation program 
($17,000 per participant).76
Yet, despite the problematic conditions and poor 
outcomes, most states continue to rely heavily 
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on residential placements even for youth posing 
minimal risks to public safety. The result is 
wholesale misallocation—and waste—of taxpayer 
resources. (See Fig. 7 above.)
Though no official data set is available to docu-
ment the budget of every state for juvenile cor-
rections generally or for residential confinement 
specifically, the American Correctional Associa-
tion77 and the CJCA78 both attempt to collect 
state juvenile corrections spending data each year. 
Though incomplete, their reports suggest that 
in all the states combined, taxpayers spent about 
$5 billion in 2008 to confine and house youthful 
offenders in juvenile institutions.
Data on how much states and localities spend 
on non-residential supervision and treatment 
programs are even harder to find. But there’s 
no doubt that residential programs consume 
the bulk of all juvenile justice resources in most 
states. For instance, in Maryland and Florida 
the state government is responsible both for 
correctional facilities and for probation and 
community-based supervision: Both states spend 
about twice as much on facilities as they do on 
probation supervision and non-residential treat-
ment services—even though the vast majority of 
youth referred to juvenile courts are never placed 
in residential facilities.79
These lopsided budgets are especially problem-
atic given the evidence that correctional place-
ments are an inefficient use of taxpayer money.
n A 2006 study compared the costs and effective-
ness of community supervision and treatment 
programs versus residential confinement in Ohio. 
Community programs had far lower costs (aver-
age of $8,539 per youth) than placement into 
a community corrections facility ($36,571) or 
state training school ($57,194). Except for the 
highest-risk offenders, community programs led 
to rearrest and subsequent confinement rates that 
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ANNUAL COST OF JUVENILE INCARCERATION VERSUS OTHER YOUTH INVESTMENTS 
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were equal to or better than those resulting from 
confinement.80
n A 1990 study in Wayne County (Detroit), 
Michigan, randomly assigned serious but 
non-violent youth offenders to either intensive 
community supervision or state custody. Many 
of the youth placed in intensive supervision 
were arrested during the period they might 
otherwise have been incarcerated, mostly for 
minor offenses. Youth placed in state custody, by 
contrast, proved more inclined toward serious 
and violent offending following release, and they 
were less likely to desist from delinquency. The 
biggest difference was price: taxpayer costs for 
youth in state custody were three times those for 
youth in intensive supervision.81
Even more dramatic disparities emerge from 
studies comparing residential confinement with 
the evidence-based treatment models (like MST 
and FFT) described earlier. The Washington 
State Institute for Public Policy found that while 
Multidimensional Treatment Foster Care costs 
$7,000 more per young person than a conven-
tional group home placement, each placement 
in MTFC ultimately saves an estimated $96,000 
in lower costs to victims and the criminal justice 
system—a return of $14 for every extra dollar 
spent on treatment.82
Added Costs of Defending the Indefensible. 
The outsized expense of correctional confine-
ment grows even larger when states face the 
added costs of complying with legal settlements 
imposed through litigation over conditions of 
confinement. 
Since 1999, when the Los Angeles Times began 
documenting widespread violence and maltreat-
ment in California Youth Authority facilities, the 
annual cost of confining one youth in California 
has grown from $45,000 to $252,000.83  (See 
Fig. 8 below.) By comparison, in-state tuition 
and fees at the state’s flagship university, the 
University of California–Berkeley, were less than 
$11,000 in 2010–11.84 In New York, where 
facility populations have also dropped dramati-
cally, daily costs in the depopulated facilities have 
exploded to sometimes absurd levels. The state 
spent $170 million in the 2010–11 fiscal year to 
oversee fewer than 700 youth,85 which translates 
to a daily cost of $665 per day—more than 
the $619 required to reserve a deluxe room for 
a night at the renowned Waldorf Astoria hotel 
in Manhattan.86 In other states, too, the costs 
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IMPACT OF LITIGATION ON COSTS OF JUVENILE CONFINEMENT IN CALIFORNIA
Source: Juvenile Justice Reform: Realigning Responsibilities, Little Hoover Commission, 2008. 
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Inadequate Despite their exorbitant daily costs, most juvenile  
correctional facilities are ill-prepared to address the needs of many  
confined youth. Often, they fail to provide even the minimum services 
appropriate for the care and rehabilitation of youth in confinement.
6.
To a remarkable extent, the adolescent boys and 
girls confined by America’s juvenile corrections 
systems suffer from severe disadvantage. In fact, 
many placements into juvenile facilities are 
prompted more by the difficulties young people 
face—their deep and unmet needs—than by the 
crimes they have committed. In effect, juvenile 
justice has become the treatment system of last 
resort for many needy youth.
But by and large, juvenile corrections facilities 
are both poorly positioned and ill-equipped to 
provide effective treatment for youth with severe 
mental health conditions, learning disabilities, 
out-of-control substance abuse habits, and other 
acute needs.
Youth in Dire Need. In 2010, the U.S. Office 
of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention 
released the first-ever survey of youth confined by 
America’s juvenile justice systems. This Survey of 
Youth in Residential Placement revealed that the 
young people locked inside our nation’s deep-end 
juvenile justice facilities are overwhelmingly the 
product of tragic circumstances. (See Fig. 9 on 
p. 24.)
Three of every 10 youth confined in correc-
tional facilities had, on at least one occasion, 
attempted suicide. Seventy percent said that they 
had personally “seen someone severely injured or 
killed,” and 72 percent said that they had “had 
something very bad or terrible happen to you.”87 
Among committed youth in all types of juvenile 
facilities, 30 percent had been physically and/
or sexually abused.88 More than 60 percent of 
youth included in the survey suffered with anger 
management issues.89 Half exhibited elevated 
required to improve conditions and comply with 
settlement agreements have been substantial.
Perhaps the biggest cost associated with America’s 
continuing overreliance on correctional facilities 
and other residential placements is what econo-
mists refer to as opportunity cost—the lost value 
of benefits that could be realized if these funds 
were reapplied to more productive uses.
In this era of mass unemployment and runaway 
deficits at every level of government, public 
agencies are slashing the budgets of many 
programs crucial to the well-being of children, 
families, and communities. Teachers are being 
laid off in many jurisdictions; police officers 
as well. Summer youth employment programs 
and afterschool recreational programs are being 
defunded. These cutbacks are particularly dam-
aging for youth at risk for involvement in the 
juvenile justice system. Yet many states continue 
to spend tens or hundreds of millions of dollars 
committing youth to correctional facilities that 
are dangerous, ineffective, wasteful, and often 
unnecessary. 
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Widespread Racial and Procedural Injustice
In addition to the many practical shortcomings of our nation’s juvenile correctional 
facilities—violence and abuse, poor outcomes, fiscal waste, and inadequate treatment 
services—the legal processes used to incarcerate youth often violate core American  
values of fairness and due process. The most glaring of these injustices involve racial 
inequities and the failure to provide youth with effective legal representation.
Unequal Treatment. At virtually every stage of the juvenile justice process, youth of 
color—Latinos and African Americans, particularly—receive harsher treatment than their 
white counterparts, even when they enter the justice system with identical charges and 
offending histories. Compared with white juveniles, African-American youth are: more 
likely to be formally charged (and less likely to have their cases dismissed or diverted 
from court); far more likely to be detained pending trial; and more likely to be commit-
ted to a residential facility (and less likely to receive a probation sentence). Among youth 
adjudicated delinquent in juvenile court, African-American youth are more likely than 
white youth to be placed and, if placed, more likely to be sent to a state youth correctional 
facility, rather than a private group home or residential treatment center. Finally, African-
American youth are nine times as likely to be sentenced to adult prisons as white youth.90 
Piled one on top of the other, the ultimate impact of these serial disparities is an enor-
mous cumulative disadvantage for youth of color. 
Lack of Effective Legal Representation. The right to an attorney is fundamental to the 
American system of justice, and—given their lesser maturity and weaker understanding 
of the legal system—quality legal representation is especially important for youthful 
offenders. Nonetheless, effective representation remains a scarce commodity for court-
involved youth. In 2009, a comprehensive review of juvenile indigent defense found that 
“modern-day juvenile courts continue to deny many low-income youth nationwide the 
legal representation to which they are entitled under the United States Constitution.”91 
Pointedly, this study asserted that the nation’s “broken” indigent defense systems for 
juvenile offenders “increase the likelihood that low-income youth will suffer the conse-
quences of false confessions, unconstitutional guilty pleas, wrongful convictions, pretrial 
detention, and incarceration in secure facilities.”92
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Source: Online data analysis of the Survey of Youth in Residential Placement, U.S. Office of Juvenile Justice 
and Delinquency Prevention. 
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IN JUVENILE CORRECTIONAL FACILITIES WHO HAVE EVER...
symptoms for anxiety, and half for depression 
as well.93 More than two-thirds reported serious 
substance abuse problems, and 59 percent said 
that they had been getting drunk or high several 
times per week (or daily) in the months leading 
up to their arrest.94
A number of other recent studies have also found 
mental health problems at epidemic levels among 
confined youth. On average, the research finds 
that about two-thirds of youth confined in juve-
nile facilities suffer from one or more diagnosable 
mental health conditions—several times the 
rate of youth in the general population. About 
one of every five youth in custody has a mental 
health disturbance that significantly impairs their 
capacity to function.95 Though these symptoms 
can sometimes be caused or exacerbated by the 
confinement experience itself, there is little doubt 
that juvenile justice youth suffer an unusually 
high prevalence of mental illness.
Youth confined in juvenile justice facilities also 
suffer from learning disabilities at exceptional 
rates96—and they exhibit extremely low levels of 
academic achievement and school success. Stud-
ies find that youth in correctional confinement 
score four years below grade level on average. 
Most have been suspended from school, and 
most have been left back at least one grade.97
Glaring Lack of Effective Support. Most of the 
young people involved in the deep end of our 
nation’s juvenile justice systems have significant 
emotional, cognitive, and intellectual defi-
cits—needs often rooted in severe trauma and 
deprivation. They need serious help. Yet in most 
cases, juvenile correctional facilities are unable to 
provide it. Crucial gaps are commonplace.
Mental Health Treatment. Among all youth in 
correctional confinement nationwide, more than 
half are held in facilities that do not conduct 
mental health assessments for all residents. When 
assessments are performed, they are often done 
in a haphazard fashion or by untrained staff. The 
Survey of Youth in Residential Placement found 
that two of every five youth in a residential com-
mitment program had not received any mental 
health counseling. Amazingly, youth with serious 
mental health symptoms (anger, anxiety, suicidal 
feelings, attention deficits—even hallucinations)  
were less likely than other youth to receive coun-
seling.98 On the other hand, troubling reports 
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have emerged in recent years showing that many 
confined youth are given powerful psychotropic 
medications—called atypicals—sometimes with-
out appropriate diagnosis and oversight.99
Substance Abuse Treatment. The Survey of Youth 
in Residential Placement also found significant 
gaps in the scope and quality of substance abuse 
treatment. One-fifth of confined youth reside in 
juvenile facilities that do not screen any residents 
for substance abuse, and another 17 percent 
reside in facilities that screen some but not all 
youth.100 Despite the pervasiveness of substance 
abuse, 42 percent of youth residing in juvenile 
corrections facilities do not receive any substance 
abuse treatment. This includes 35 percent of 
youth who report daily use of alcohol and drugs 
prior to being removed from their homes.101 
Educational Programming. Available evidence 
suggests that the quality of education services 
offered to confined youth is often deficient. 
“Nationally, the educational programs of many 
state juvenile justice systems receive failing 
grades,” reported a team of scholars in 2003. 
“Recurrent problems include overcrowding, 
frequent movement of students, lack of qualified 
teachers, an inability to address gaps in students’ 
schooling, and a lack of collaboration with 
the public school system.”102 Including both 
detained and committed youth, just 45 percent 
of those with a previously diagnosed learning 
disability receive special education services while 
in custody.103
Treatment Environment. Even if juvenile correc-
tions facilities provide high-quality education, 
mental health, and substance abuse treatment 
services, youth are unlikely to benefit when the 
overall environment of the facility is permeated 
with fear, violence, or maltreatment. Yet the 
majority of youth in correctional confinement 
(55 percent) believe that youth in their facilities 
are punished unfairly by staff, and nearly half (42 
percent) are afraid of being physically attacked. 
Over 40 percent of youth in correctional facili-
ties say that staff are disrespectful and that they 
physically restrain youth without justification.104
Transitional Support. Whatever benefits youth 
derive from the treatment and assistance they 
receive (or don’t receive) while confined in 
juvenile facilities, young people exiting residen-
tial placements will be tested severely during 
their transitions home. Yet the scope and quality 
of aftercare support provided by youth correc-
tions agencies nationwide is notoriously weak. 
According to Pat Arthur, a senior attorney for 
the National Center for Youth Law, “Very little 
is done to help young people make the transi-
tion from school in the correctional setting to an 
appropriate school placement upon reentry.”105 
Despite the prevalence of severe substance abuse 
and psychiatric disorders among confined youth, 
few facilities take concerted action to sustain 
mental health and substance abuse treatment or 
to reinstate health insurance coverage as youth 
transition home.106
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United States: 1997 to 2007. Between 1997 and 
2007, the date of the most recent Census of 
Juveniles in Residential Placement, the share of 
the juvenile population confined in correctional 
custody nationwide declined from 256 of every 
100,000 youth to 194—a 24 percent reduc-
tion. The rate at which adjudicated youth were 
confined in facilities described as long-term 
secure care correctional facilities—which include 
most training schools and youth prisons—plum-
meted 41 percent over this decade.107 Despite the 
reduced reliance on incarceration, juvenile crime 
rates fell across the board from 1997 to 2007, 
including a 27 percent drop in the juvenile arrest 
rate for violent index crimes.108 Clearly during 
this decade, reduced juvenile incarceration did 
not spark a new wave of youth violence.
A more detailed analysis comparing trends at the 
state level finds no correlation between juvenile 
confinement rates and violent youth crime. 
When states are broken into four groups based on 
the change in their rates of juvenile confinement 
from 1997 to 2007, the states that decreased 
juvenile confinement rates most sharply (40 
percent or more) saw a slightly greater decline in 
juvenile violent crime arrest rates than states that 
increased their youth confinement rates. States 
that reduced juvenile confinement slightly (0 to 
20 percent) or moderately (20 to 40 percent) 
saw a smaller reduction in juvenile violent felony 
arrest rates.109 (See Fig. 10 on p. 27.)
California 1996 to 2009. On a typical day in 
1996, the California Youth Authority incarcer-
ated 10,000 youth.110 By June 2010, the average 
daily population of committed youth in state 
correctional facilities had dropped to under 
1,500—an 85 percent decline.111 Even includ-
ing the substantial number of California youth 
housed in county-run correctional camps, the 
state’s incarcerated juvenile population declined 
50 percent from 1999 through 2008.112 
Contrary to the common presumption that more 
incarceration breeds less crime, California’s juve-
nile crime rates have declined substantially during 
this period of rapid de-incarceration. The arrest 
rate for property index offenses fell steadily from 
1995 through 2009.113 The juvenile arrest rate for 
violent index crimes also declined substantially, 
falling in 2009 to its lowest level since 1970.114
More detailed analysis of trends in within Cali fornia 
provides no suggestion that greater reliance on 
incarceration improves public safety. In a July 2010 
publication, the Center on Juvenile and Criminal 
Justice analyzed California’s juvenile crime and 
correctional trends at the county level. “Across the 
state, the lowest-level and fastest-declining coun-
ties in terms of juvenile incarceration rates did not 
have significantly different juvenile crime rates or 
changes in crime rates compared to counties with 
the highest-level and fastest-increasing juvenile 
incarceration rates,” the report found.115
Texas Before and After 2007. Unlike California, 
Texas began to steadily increase its incarcerated 
juvenile population in the mid-1990s. Between 
1995 and 2000, Texas doubled the number of 
youth in state custody and then permitted popu-
lations to fall only modestly over the subsequent 
six years.116 Yet, despite pursuing a diametrically 
opposite incarceration policy, Texas achieved 
juvenile crime outcomes eerily similar to California 
Is It Really Safe to Reduce Juvenile Confinement?
Jurisdictions that have substantially reduced youth confinement in recent times have not suffered any 
increase in juvenile offending. Indeed, sharply reducing juvenile custody populations seems not to 
exert any independent upward impact on juvenile offending rates.
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FIGURE 10
JUVENILE VIOLENT INDEX ARREST TRENDS IN STATES WITH DECLINING AND 
INCREASING JUVENILE CONFINEMENT RATES (1997–2007)
Source: Author’s analysis, using data from the 1997 and 2007 Census of Juveniles in Residential Placement; and 1997 and 2007 FBI 
Arrest Statistics, both available at www.ojjdp.gov/ojstatbb.
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TEXAS VS. CALIFORNIA: OPPOSITE JUVENILE INCARCERATION POLICIES, IDENTICAL RESULTS
1,000
1,500
2,000
2,500
3,000
1995             1996              1997             1998               1999             2000             2001              2002              2003              2004            2005  
CALIFORNIA                  TEXAS
Source: Males, Stahlkapf, & Macallair, Crime Rates and Youth Incarceration in Texas and California Compared: Public Safety or Public 
Waste?, Center on Juvenile & Criminal Justice, June 2007.
For more information, visit www.aecf.org/noplaceforkids.
PERCENT CHANGE IN JUVENILE 
INCARCERATION RATES: 1995 TO 2005
TEXAS  +48%          CALIFORNIA  -75%
from 1995 through 2006. The two states had 
virtually identical juvenile arrest rates for serious 
index crimes in 1995 and saw an identical 51 
percent decline over the subsequent 11 years.117 
(See Fig. 11 below.)
Since its youth corrections system descended into 
scandal in 2007, Texas has precipitously reversed 
course on juvenile incarceration. The Texas 
Youth Commission’s daily confined population 
has fallen from 4,800 at the end of August 2006 
to 2,250 in August 2009 and 1,800 by August 
2010.118 Yet again, contrary to the theories of 
incapacitation and general deterrence, neither the  
state’s crime rate nor its juvenile arrest totals have  
increased since 2006. Violent juvenile felony 
arrests in Texas fell by 10 percent from 2006 to  
2009, and total juvenile arrests fell by 9 percent.119
These data leave little doubt. Substantially reduc-
ing juvenile incarceration rates has not proven to 
be a catalyst for more youth crime.
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Limit Eligibility for Correctional Placements 
Commitment to a juvenile corrections facility should be reserved for youth who have  
committed serious offenses and pose a clear and demonstrable risk to public safety.1.PRIORI
T
Y
The case against juvenile corrections facilities is 
overwhelming. Countless studies and decades of 
experience show that these institutions are both 
dangerous and ineffective. Given the limited 
offending histories of most youth placed into 
custody, secure confinement is more often than 
not unnecessary. Exhaustive research shows cor-
rectional confinement is an obsolete and finan-
cially wasteful model for the care and treatment 
of delinquent youth. Meanwhile, the care pro-
vided in correctional facilities is often inadequate 
to meet the extraordinary needs faced by many 
confined youth.
Over the past three decades, delinquency 
scholars have achieved significant advances in 
determining what works in reversing delinquent 
behavior—including the development of several 
interventions that yield better outcomes than 
incarceration at a fraction of the cost. Mean-
while, pioneering jurisdictions across the nation 
have made noteworthy progress in recent years 
reducing the unnecessary and inappropriate use 
of correctional confinement. Numerous states 
have closed facilities or lowered correctional pop-
ulations, reaping significant savings for taxpayers 
without any measurable increase in youth crime. 
Indeed, if states adopt proven best practices for 
managing juvenile offenders and then reallocate 
funds currently spent on incarceration to more 
constructive crime prevention and treatment 
strategies, there is every reason to believe that 
reducing juvenile facility populations will result 
in less crime, not more.
The final chapter of this report provides an 
action agenda for states seeking to improve 
outcomes in their juvenile justice systems by 
severing their long-standing fealty to the youth 
incarceration model. Specifically, it identifies six 
key priorities for action.
How Should States Go About Reforming  
Juvenile Corrections?
How can states and communities best go about reducing incarceration rates and closing youth correc-
tions facilities to ensure that reform efforts are safe, responsible, constructive, and cost-effective?
The most direct strategy for reducing the popula-
tions of juvenile corrections facilities is to sharply 
limit, by statute, the categories of youth who are 
eligible for correctional placement. Several states 
have taken just this approach in recent years, 
with auspicious results. (See Fig. 12 on p. 29.) 
In 2007, California banned placements to state 
juvenile corrections facilities for all low-level and 
non-violent offenders. Texas passed a law the 
same year prohibiting commitments to the Texas 
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Youth Commission except for youth adjudi-
cated for felony-level offenses. In the 1990s, 
North Carolina and Virginia both enacted rules 
prohibiting commitments for lower-level offenses 
except for youth with serious histories of prior 
offending. In 2008, Alabama outlawed all com-
mitments for status offenses or for probation 
violations in cases where a status offense was the 
underlying charge. 
These kinds of new rules are important not just 
for the admissions they specifically prohibit, but 
also for the signal they send to judges and other 
juvenile justice personnel about the need to limit 
reliance on incarceration. In each of the states 
cited above, correctional populations have fallen 
far more than required specifically to meet the 
stricter guidelines. 
Regardless of the specific criteria states adopt, 
what’s important is to tie placement eligibility to 
the crimes youth have committed and their risks 
of re-offending—not to their needs for treatment 
or services.
FIGURE 12
WHEN STATES PLACE LIMITS ON CORRECTIONAL COMMITMENTS... JUVENILE INCARCERATION PLUMMETS
   Year Change in Incarceration
 State Limiting Provision Enacted Since Policy Was Enacted
 AL Prohibit commitments of youth adjudicated for status  2008 –40 percent 
  offenses, as well as for probation violations where a status   (daily population in state 
  offense was the underlying charge  commitment programs)
 CA State commitments allowed only for youth adjudicated for  2007 –40 percent 
  serious violent offenses  (daily population in state 
    training schools)
 NC Correctional commitments authorized only for youth  1998 –73 percent 
  adjudicated for violent crimes plus a moderate or extended   (annual commitments to 
  history of prior offending, or for serious non-violent crimes   state training schools) 
  if youth also had an extended history of prior offending
 TX Correctional commitments authorized only for youth  2007 –69 percent 
  adjudicated for felony offenses  (daily population in state 
    training schools)
 VA Correctional commitments allowed only for youth with  1996 –52 percent 
  a felony adjudication or a serious misdemeanor offense if   (annual admissions to 
  youth also has previously been adjudicated for a felony or   state training schools) 
  four serious misdemeanor offenses
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Among the most long-standing and crippling 
weaknesses in America’s juvenile justice systems is 
a dearth of local options. Often, judges are forced 
to make an untenable choice between probation 
or incarceration for adolescents with moderately 
serious offending histories who do not pose an 
immediate or significant threat to public safety. 
To fill this void, state and local courts and correc-
tions systems should invest in and substantially 
expand access to intensive and high-quality 
alternatives to incarceration such as: 
n Evidence-based family intervention models 
like Multisystemic Therapy, Functional Family 
Therapy, and Multidimensional Treatment Foster 
Care—the three specific intervention models 
that have repeatedly proven effective with serious 
youthful offenders.
n Rigorous career preparation and vocational train-
ing programs, such as YouthBuild, that combine 
academic instruction, work experience, and 
counseling full time over several months.
n Intensive youth advocate and mentoring pro-
grams, which assign youth development workers 
to supervise, monitor, and mentor delinquent 
youth in the community. 
n Cognitive-behavioral skills training, either as a 
stand-alone treatment or in combination with 
other programming.
n Specialized mental health and substance abuse 
treatment models that have shown significant suc-
cess in helping lower offending rates and improve 
youths’ behavior, including wraparound services, 
mental and behavioral health diversion projects, 
and high-quality substance abuse treatment. 
These enhanced treatment programs and alterna-
tives to incarceration should be reserved for youth 
with significant records of delinquency. Youth 
with limited offending histories—even those 
with severe emotional disturbances, substance 
abuse problems, or other mental health condi-
tions—should be diverted from juvenile court 
entirely. Need alone should not be a pretext for 
deep penetration into the juvenile justice system.
Invest in Promising Non­Residential Alternatives 
In every jurisdiction, juvenile justice leaders must erect a broad continuum of  
high-quality services, supervision programs, and dispositional options to supervise  
and treat youthful offenders in their home communities.
2.PRIORI
T
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*Another 80 youth per day in 2009 were confined in a privately operated treatment facility for chronic and/or violent youth 
offenders under contract with Wayne County.
Change the Financial Incentives 
States must eliminate counterproductive financial incentives that encourage  
overreliance on correctional placements. 3.PRIORI
T
Y
In most states, commitments to state custody are 
funded entirely with state funds, whereas local 
jurisdictions must foot the bill for community-
based supervision and treatment programs. 
Fortunately, several states have devised creative 
approaches in recent years to revamp their fund-
ing mechanisms and increase the incentive for 
local courts to treat delinquent youth in their 
communities whenever possible.
Under the RECLAIM Ohio program, coun-
ties receive a fixed budget allocation but must 
reimburse the state for each youth committed to 
a correctional facility. The fewer youth counties 
place, the more funds they have available to sup-
port local treatment and supervision programs. 
Statewide, RECLAIM led to a 36 percent reduc-
tion in commitments after it was launched in the 
1990s, an early evaluation found.120 Subsequent 
studies have shown that the community-based 
RECLAIM programs reduce offending by low- 
and moderate-risk youth participants and yield 
substantial savings for taxpayers. Redeploy Illi-
nois, modeled on RECLAIM Ohio, substantially 
reduced commitments in four participating pilot 
sites from 2004 through 2007. Overall commit-
ments in the pilot sites fell from 212 in 2004 to 
96 in 2007 (a 55 percent drop).121 Wisconsin’s 
Youth Aids program provides $100 million per 
year to counties to cover the costs of all juvenile 
programming, but—other than youth adjudi-
cated for the most serious violent crimes—the 
counties are charged the full cost of care for all 
youth placed in state facilities.122 Under Penn-
sylvania’s Act 148, counties receive 80 percent 
reimbursement for non-residential programs and 
services in the community, and for placement 
into non-secure community-based group homes, 
but they receive just 60 percent for commitments 
to secure institutions.123
Before state officials and county leaders in Michi-
gan’s Wayne County (in and around Detroit) 
struck an innovative agreement in 2000, judges 
committed several hundred youthful offenders to 
state youth corrections facilities each year. Under 
the new agreement, Wayne County retains 
responsibility for all committed youth, and the 
state reimburses the county for half of its costs 
to supervise and treat them locally. The county 
contracts with five community-based social 
service agencies to oversee youth offenders with 
appropriate levels of supervision and treatment. 
Nearly half of the youth assigned to these care 
management organizations remained in their 
own homes in 2009, and most of the remaining 
youth were housed in low- or moderate-security 
group homes or residential treatment centers.124 
Only 18 youth per day were held in state train-
ing schools in 2009—down from 597 per day in 
1999.* Few youth (less than 2 percent) commit 
felony offenses while under the supervision of 
care management organizations, and recidivism 
rates following treatment are well below those 
typical for youth released from juvenile correc-
tions facilities.125
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Specifically, state and local juvenile justice leaders 
should:
Implement Detention Reform. Now operating in 
150 jurisdictions in 35 states plus the District 
of Columbia, the Annie E. Casey Foundation’s 
Juvenile Detention Alternatives Initiative (JDAI) 
has reduced the daily detention populations in 
participating sites by 41 percent. JDAI jurisdic-
tions have also reduced the number of youth-
ful offenders committed to state custody by 34 
percent.128 Because youth detained pending their 
adjudication hearings are placed more frequently 
in residential facilities than youth who remain in 
the community, detention reform is an essential 
step for any jurisdiction seeking to reduce cor-
rectional confinement.
Rethink Zero Tolerance School Discipline Policies. 
Youth charged in court for minor misbehavior 
under zero tolerance school discipline policies 
are often placed on probation and can easily 
end up in a detention or corrections facility if 
they violate probation rules. Innovative juvenile 
court leaders in Clayton County, Georgia, have 
reduced school-based referrals by two-thirds since 
2004 by forging an agreement with the schools 
to limit court referrals for minor misbehavior.129 
Jefferson County (Birmingham), Alabama, 
reduced school-based referrals by 50 percent by 
initiating a similar agreement in 2009. As they 
curtailed zero tolerance, both these counties have 
substantially reduced correctional placements.
Make Better Use of Juvenile Court Diversion. 
Arrests for serious violent crimes have fallen by 
one-third since their highs in the mid-1990s, 
and serious property crime arrests have fallen by 
nearly half.130  Yet the total number of youth peti-
tioned and found delinquent in juvenile courts 
nationwide has fallen much more modestly due 
to juvenile courts’ increasing propensity to pros-
ecute youth for minor offenses.131 Growing evi-
dence suggests that involvement in juvenile court 
proceedings can itself be criminogenic—reducing 
the likelihood that young people will age out of 
delinquency as they mature. Expanding diversion 
and limiting formal court processing of non-
serious offenses can reduce the number of youth 
Adopt Best Practice Reforms for Managing Youth Offenders
In addition to better programmatic alternatives, every jurisdiction must adopt  
complementary policies, practices, and procedures to limit unnecessary commitments  
and reduce confinement populations. 
4.PRIORI
T
Y
Before California prohibited state commitments 
for misdemeanors and most non-violent felony 
crimes in 2007, the population in state youth 
correctional facilities had already fallen from a 
high of 10,000 in 1996 to just 2,500. Most of 
these reductions can be traced to an innovative 
sliding-scale fee schedule enacted in 1996 that 
substantially increased the cost to counties for 
commitments of low-level offenders. Before the 
law was enacted, counties paid just a token fee 
($25 per month) for any youth in state custody.  
Under the new rules, the counties still paid little 
($150 per month) for the most serious offenders, 
but they had to pay 50–100 percent of the actual 
cost for youth with less significant offending 
histories.126 The state’s confined population fell 
by more than half in the first seven years after the 
sliding-scale fees were imposed.127
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who penetrate into the deep end of the juvenile 
corrections system.
Enhance Legal Representation and Advocacy. 
Alarming numbers of youth go through the 
juvenile court process without legal representa-
tion. Even when youth are represented, caseloads 
are often excessive and juvenile court culture 
often discourages aggressive advocacy.132 This 
lack of timely, competent, and energetic repre-
sentation is unjust. It also leads to unnecessary 
commitments into correctional facilities and 
other residential placements. Early appointment 
of counsel, to allow time for defenders to prepare 
for detention hearings, can reduce the number of 
youth confined pending trial—and therefore the 
likelihood of subsequent commitments. Funding 
for enhanced legal advocacy can lower placement 
rates and improve outcomes for youth while 
producing a net savings for taxpayers. In both 
Seattle and Florida, “TeamChild” legal advocacy 
projects have substantially improved outcomes 
for youth.133 In Ohio, youth receiving enhanced 
legal advocacy proved only one-fourth as likely 
as a control group to be sentenced to a youth 
corrections facility, and they spent one-fourth as 
many days in state facilities.134
Reduce Correctional Placements Resulting from 
Violations of Probation. One of every eight youth 
in secure correctional custody nationwide is com-
mitted for violating probation or aftercare rules, 
not for committing new crimes. Many youth 
confined on technical violations have never been 
adjudicated for violent or serious offenses. By 
establishing clear rules to calibrate the response 
to rule violations and requiring supervisor 
approval before any decision to confine youth 
for those violations, many jurisdictions have 
substantially lowered the number of youth 
placed in or returned to custody for techni-
cal violations. Alabama reduced the number of 
youth committed on probation violations by 
two-thirds from 2006 to 2009.135 In Florida, 
where several jurisdictions have adopted proba-
tion practice reforms, commitments for viola-
tions of probation fell 28 percent from 2005–06 
to 2007–08.136 
Limit Lengths of Stay in Correctional Facilities 
and Other Residential Placements. Youth should 
remain in confinement only for a limited period, 
less than a year in most cases (and far shorter in 
many cases). Research is clear that longer stays 
in correctional custody do not reduce future 
offending. However, long stays add substantially 
to state youth corrections budgets while harm-
ing youths’ prospects for success in adult life. A 
recent analysis of confinement trends in Florida 
found that the average length of stay for confined 
youth rose 30 percent between 2000–01 and 
2007–08—costing the state’s taxpayers an esti-
mated $20 million per year.137 Reducing lengths 
of stay enough to conform with best practices 
could save Florida up to $49 million per year.138
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5.PRIORI
T
Y Replace Large Institutions With Small, Treatment­Oriented Facilities  
for the Dangerous Few
The limited number of youthful offenders whose serious and chronic offending demand secure 
confinement should be placed into small, humane, and treatment-oriented facilities.
The superiority of small, community-based 
juvenile corrections facilities over larger, conven-
tional training schools is widely recognized in the 
juvenile justice field. The advantages of smaller 
facilities include: the chance to keep youth close 
to home and engage their families; greater oppor-
tunity to recruit mentors and other volunteers; 
and a more hospitable treatment environment.
The primary mission of small secure facilities, 
as well as group homes and other placement 
facilities, should be to help youth make lasting 
behavior changes and to build the skills and self-
awareness necessary to succeed following release. 
One of the most consistent findings of research 
in juvenile corrections is that interventions aim-
ing to build skills and address human needs are 
far more effective than those aimed at deterrence 
or punishment. 
In pursuing this mission, states will do well to 
follow the example of Missouri, which closed its 
long-troubled training schools in the early 1980s. 
Since then, Missouri’s Division of Youth Services 
has divided the state into five regions and built 
a continuum of programs in each, ranging from 
day treatment programs and non-secure group 
homes, to moderately secure facilities located 
in state parks and college campuses, to secure 
care facilities. None of the facilities holds more 
than 50 youth, and each of the state’s six secure 
care facilities houses just 30 to 36 youth. In 
every Missouri facility, youth are placed in small 
groups that participate together in all educa-
tion, treatment, meals, recreation, and free time. 
Throughout their stays in DYS facilities, youth 
are challenged to discuss their feelings, gain 
insights into their behaviors, and build their 
capacity to express their thoughts and emotions 
clearly, calmly, and respectfully—even when 
they are upset or angry. DYS staff engage the 
families of confined youth and work with family 
members to devise successful reentry plans. DYS 
assigns a single case manager to oversee each 
youth from the time of commitment through 
release and into aftercare, and it provides youth 
with extensive supervision and support through-
out the critical reentry period. 
Through this approach, Missouri has achieved 
reoffending rates that are lower than those of 
other states. Missouri’s model has been cited as 
a national model by the New York Times in 2007 
and earned a national “Innovations in American 
Government” award from Harvard University 
in 2008.139
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What Role for Group Homes?
If training schools and other large correctional institutions are not a suitable venue for 
the care and treatment of juvenile offenders, how about group homes, residential treat-
ment centers, or wilderness programs? What role should these and other non-secure 
residential programs play in a redesigned juvenile corrections system?
While available research on non-secure residential programming is limited, most studies 
find that long-term outcomes are unfavorable. A recent study of 449 delinquent youth 
placed into group homes in Los Angeles found a host of “negative life outcomes,” includ-
ing high rates of drug abuse, criminality, and educational failure. Seven years after being 
referred to group homes, one-fourth of these youth were incarcerated, and 12 were dead—
seven of them by gunshot wounds.140 A number of studies have found that group home 
placements lead to worse outcomes than evidence-based non-residential treatment or 
high-quality treatment foster care.141 Wilderness programs and boot camps have also shown 
little success in reducing the criminality or improving outcomes for delinquent youth, as 
have residential treatment centers for youth with serious emotional disturbances. 
Though group homes typically conform more closely than training schools to best prac-
tice in correctional treatment (small facilities, close to home, staffed by youth develop-
ment personnel rather than guards, oriented to positive youth development rather than 
punishment), they are also susceptible to abuse and violence. Staff salaries are typically 
low, turnover rates high, and state oversight via licensing and regulation and accredita-
tion often lax. Other types of group care facilities—boot camps and wilderness programs in 
particular—have seen many instances of abuse and even deaths in recent years.
Despite these inauspicious research results, most juvenile justice experts believe that 
group homes and other non-secure residential facilities should be part of the continuum 
of available dispositions for adjudicated youth—particularly for youth from severely 
troubled homes, and those for whom a parent or guardian cannot be located. Also, resi-
dential placements can provide a valuable cooling off experience for some youth who 
have descended into a particularly extreme behavioral cycle. Finally, there is considerable 
support for group homes as a step-down placement for youth returning home following 
secure confinement. However, group homes and other non-secure facility placements 
should not be widely employed as a middle option between probation supervision and 
secure custody. There is simply insufficient evidence that these placements have a 
positive long-term impact on the well-being of young people. 
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Use Data to Hold Systems Accountable 
Strong data collection must be a central pillar of efforts to reform juvenile corrections  
systems and to reduce overreliance on incarceration and residential placement. 6.PRIORI
T
Y
Insufficient data collection and outcomes 
accountability is one of the pivotal weaknesses in 
America’s juvenile justice systems, and a crucial 
factor behind the continued prevalence of incar-
ceration and other counterproductive practices.
Carefully Measure Recidivism. Given the high 
price of secure confinement and the heavy costs 
to youth in liberty denied and opportunity 
lost, rigorous recidivism data are essential. Yet, 
serious gaps remain in states’ efforts to collect 
and report recidivism results: 12 states still do 
not track recidivism outcomes of youth released 
from juvenile facilities statewide in any fashion; 
six states track only the share of youth who 
return to juvenile custody; and another eight 
measure youths’ success only for 12 months or 
less following release. Even among states that do 
track meaningful measures of re-offending into 
early adulthood, outcome measures and method-
ologies vary widely—making cross-state com-
parisons problematic. The Council of Juvenile 
Correctional Administrators has recommended 
that states adhere to common definitions and 
measures of recidivism.142 Not included in the 
CJCA list, but just as important, states should 
compare the recidivism outcomes of correctional 
facilities and other residential programs versus 
intensive community-based interventions that 
are far cheaper and less restrictive.
Track Youths’ Success After Release. While recidi-
vism is important, it should not be the only 
standard used to monitor the effectiveness of 
juvenile corrections systems. These systems 
should also be measured on how well they help 
delinquent youth achieve progress toward success 
in adulthood. How much academic progress do 
youth make while confined in youth facilities or 
enrolled in court-sanctioned programs? What 
percentage of previously confined youth reenroll 
in school and remain to graduation? How many 
are placed into jobs, and become steady workers? 
How much progress do youth make in overcom-
ing behavioral health problems and reducing 
symptoms of mental illness? 
Examine Racial Disparities. Given the pervasive 
and continuing racial disparities at all levels of 
our nation’s juvenile justice systems, every state 
and every locality should be collecting and disag-
gregating data to identify policies, programs, and 
practices that may adversely or unfairly impact 
youth based on their race, gender, or ethnicity. 
Just as important, state and local juvenile justice 
leaders need to use those data to analyze their 
systems to pinpoint the hidden factors that may 
be perpetuating unjust disparities.
Monitor Conditions of Confinement. All youth 
corrections institutions should be subject to 
rigorous oversight with maximum transpar-
ency to detect physical abuse, sexual abuse, 
and excessive use of isolation and restraints 
whenever and wherever they occur. At a mini-
mum, states should tighten rules and strengthen 
systems to ensure accurate and timely reporting 
of all unusual incidents, injuries, and deaths 
that occur in juvenile facilities. In particular, 
states and localities should encourage or require 
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their facilities to participate in the CJCA’s 
Performance-based Standards initiative, which is 
working in 198 facilities in 28 states to improve 
conditions and upgrade services for confined 
youth.143 In addition, states should follow the 
lead of Maryland, Texas, and others by appoint-
ing an independent watchdog to investigate any 
reported problems with conditions or safety 
in juvenile facilities. Finally, all facilities must 
maintain a functional grievance process to ensure 
youth unfettered access to report maltreatment 
and obtain a fair hearing, without fear of reprisal. 
38
Conclusion: Embracing Better Policies, Programs, and 
Practices in Juvenile Corrections
The evidence presented in this report makes 
clear that, except in cases where juvenile 
offenders have committed serious crimes and 
pose a clear and present danger to society, 
removing troubled and delinquent young peo-
ple from their homes and families is expensive 
and often unnecessary—with results no better 
(and often far worse) on average than commu-
nity-based supervision and treatment. Like-
wise, the evidence makes clear that throwing 
even serious youth offenders together in large, 
prison-like, and often-abusive institutions pro-
vides no public safety benefit, wastes taxpayers’ 
money, and reduces the odds that the young 
people will mature out of their delinquency 
and become productive law-abiding citizens. 
Fortunately, we are seeing an encouraging 
shift away from juvenile incarceration in 
many states. From 1997 to 2007, the total 
population of youth in correctional place-
ments nationwide declined 24 percent, and 
the total in long-term secure correctional 
facilities dropped 41 percent.144 Of the 45 
states reporting data on the number of youth 
in correctional custody in both 1997 and 
2007, 34 reduced their confinement rates. 
Eleven states lowered their confinement rates 
by 40 percent or more during this decade, and 
another 12 states lowered confinement by 20 
to 39 percent.145
Though no nationwide figures have been 
compiled since 2007, the pace of juvenile 
de-incarceration seems only to have increased. 
An informal count conducted by the Annie E. 
Casey Foundation in August 2011 identified 
52 youth correctional facilities in 18 states, 
which have closed since the beginning of 2007. 
Several other states have closed units within 
facilities and reduced bed capacity without 
closing entire facilities. A list of youth correc-
tions facilities closed since 2007 can be found 
at www.aecf.org/noplaceforkids.
However, while this wave of facility closures 
and bed reductions is important and long-
overdue, it offers little reassurance for the 
future. In many states, the primary cause for 
closures has been the short-term fiscal crisis 
facing state governments. In other states, 
federal investigations or private class-action 
lawsuits have been the driving force behind 
facility closures. The common thread has been 
that most decisions to shut down facilities have 
been ad hoc and reactive. The closures have 
not been based on any new consensus among 
policy leaders or any new philosophic commit-
ment to reducing reliance on juvenile incar-
ceration, and they have not been informed by 
any deep or evidence-based consideration of 
how states should best pursue the path toward 
reduced incarceration. In short, we are seeing a 
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wave—a pendulum swing away from incarcer-
ation in juvenile justice. But this trend is not 
yet anchored in the kind of coherent, resilient, 
values-based, and evidence-driven movement 
needed to sustain progress once the crises of 
the moment fade into history. 
Looking to the future, the momen-
tum toward closing youth facili-
ties must be paired with a planned 
and comprehensive approach to 
reform. Which policies, programs, 
and practices work best? What 
safeguards are required for states 
as they depopulate correctional 
facilities for youth? What funding 
and accountability mechanisms 
are most likely to ensure success?
The goal must be broader than 
ending overreliance on juvenile 
incarceration. Rather, we must 
build a youth corrections system 
for tomorrow that is rooted in 
best practice research. Not only 
do state and local justice systems 
have to offer a balanced mix of 
treatment and supervision programs, but they
must also calibrate their systems to ensure that 
each individual youth is directed to the treat-
ments, sanctions, and services best suited to his 
or her unique needs and circumstances. 
For the first time in a generation, America 
has the opportunity to redesign the deep 
end of its juvenile justice system. The poli-
tics of the moment have made it politically 
feasible (or financially necessary) for states to 
substantially scale back their 
long-standing investment in 
conventional youth corrections 
facilities. Meanwhile, a wealth 
of new research has created the 
knowledge base necessary to 
build a fundamentally new and 
far more effective approach to 
juvenile corrections that keeps 
our communities safer, makes 
better use of scarce tax dollars, 
and increases the odds that more 
young people will desist from 
crime and succeed in the adult 
world.
The open question is whether 
our society will learn from and 
act on this information, whether 
it will not only abandon the 
long-standing incarceration 
model but also embrace this 
more constructive, humane, and cost-effective 
paradigm for how we treat, educate, and 
punish youth who break the law.
The open ques­
tion is whether 
our society will 
not only abandon 
the long­standing 
incarceration model 
but also embrace a 
more construc tive, 
humane, and cost­
effective paradigm 
for how we treat, 
educate, and  
punish youth who  
break the law.
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Additional resources and state-level data for many of the report’s research findings are available at  
www.aecf.org/noplaceforkids.
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